Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act by Player, Mack & Beaird, J. Ralph
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-1973
Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act
Mack Player
Santa Clara University School of Law
J. Ralph Beaird
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Mack Player and J. Ralph Beaird, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act , 25 Ala. L. Rev. 577 (1973),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/750
Alabama Law Review
Volume 25, Number 3, Summer 1973
FREE SPEECH AND THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN
ACT
J. Ralph Beaird* and Mack Allen Player**
I. INTRODUCTION
Intensive investigations into the internal affairs of unions by the
McClellan Committee' uncovered "racketeering, corruption, abuse of
power, and other improper practices on the part of some labor organiza-
tions.1'2 To remedy what some viewed as a distinct evil, the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)3 was
enacted by a slim majority of Congress. Among other reforms, the
LMRDA sought to counterbalance the "tyranny of the all-powerful
labor boss"4 by removing the threat of arbitrary and discriminatory
treatment of union members by an entrenched leadership while guar-
anteeing the right of union members to participate effectively in the
internal affairs of their unions. Title I of the Act (section 101(a)) specifi-
cally guarantees to every union member: (1) Equal rights and privileges
* Acting Dean and Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. B.S., 1949, LL.
B. 1951, University of Alabama; LL. M., 1953, The George Washington University.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., 1963, Drury
College; J.D., 1965, University of Missouri; LL. M., 1972, The George Washington University.
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Russell Smith for his assistance in the preparation
of this article.
i. The McClellan Committee was officially known as the Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor Management Field. For a chronicle of the activities and findings of the
committee, see R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN (1960).
2. 105 CONG. REC. 6471 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
3. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 29
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
4. 105 CONG. REc. 6472 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
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within the union to nominate candidates for union office, to vote in
union elections, and to attend union meetings;5 (2) freedom of speech
and assembly;6 (3) freedom from arbitrary increases in dues, fees, and
assessments; 7 (4) freedom to utilize judicial, administrative, and legisla-
tive processes;' (5) procedural due process in internal union disciplinary
5. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(I) (1970), provides:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such
organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor
organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and
voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in
such organization's constitution and bylaws.
6. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(2) (1970), provides:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble
freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express
at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor
organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's
established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That
nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and
enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization
as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its perform-
ance of its legal or contractual obligations.
7. LMRDA § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(3) (1970), provides:
Except in the case of a federation of national or international labor organizations, the
rates of dues and initiation fees payable by members of any labor organization in effect on
September 14, 1959 shall not be increased, and no general or special assessment shall be
levied upon such members, except-
(A) in the case of a local labor organization, (i) by majority vote by secret ballot of
the members in good standing voting at a general or special membership meeting, after
reasonable notice of the intention to vote upon such question, or (ii) by majority vote of
the members in good standing voting in a membership referendum conducted by secret
ballot; or
(B) in the case of a labor organization, other than a local labor organization or a
federation of national or international labor organizations, (i) by majority vote of the dele-
gates voting at a regular convention, or at a special convention of such labor organization
held upon not less than thirty days' written notice to the principal office of each local or
constituent labor organization entitled to such notice, or (ii) by majority vote of the mem-
bers in good standing of such labor organization voting in a membership referendum con-
ducted by secret ballot, or (iii) by majority vote of the members of the executive board or
similar governing body of such labor organization, pursuant to express authority contained
in the constitution and bylaws of such labor organization: Provided, That such action on
the part of the executive board or similar governing body shall be effective only until the
next regular convention of such labor organization.
8. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(4) (1970), provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action
in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether
or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such
action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a
witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legisla-
ture or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be
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proceedings
The original version of the LMRDA, introduced by Senators Ken-
nedy (John) and Ives in 1958, contained no provisions similar to the
guarantees now found in Title I.10 In 1959 the Senate Labor Committee
rejected proposals to include such protections for individual union mem-
bers," thus forcing Senator McClellan to introduce his "bill of rights
of union members" as a floor amendment to the committee bill. The
McClellan "bill of rights" was adopted by the narrowest of mar-
gins-47-46 with five abstentions. The McClellan floor amendment was
set aside three days later in favor of the present version of Title 1.12
Although desiring to provide broad and basic protections to union
members vis-A-vis their union, the framers of the LMRDA made it clear
that they did not intend to inject the law unnecessarily into the internal
affairs of labor organizations. 3 Conceptually, the expressed aversion
toward legislative encroachment into internal union affairs would seem
irreconcilable with the provisions of Title I, which guarantee substantial
required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse
of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings
against such organizations or any officer thereof; And provided further, That no interested
employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or partici-
pate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition.
9. LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970), provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof
unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reason-
able time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
(b) Any provision of the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization which is
inconsistent with the provisions of this section shall be of no force or effect.
10. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
I1. S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
12. 105 CONG. REC. 6475-76, 6718-27 (1959).
13. For an excellent discussion of the LMRDA's legislative history, see Aaron, The Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REv. 851 (1960); Cox, Internal
Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MicH. L. REV. 819 (1960);
Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEO. L.J. 226 (1959); Rothman, Legislative
History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REV. 199 (1960). In reporting
the bill, the Senate Labor Committee vehemently opposed "any attempt to prescribe detailed
procedures and standards for the conduct of union business. Such paternalistic regulation would
weaken rather than strengthen the labor movement; it would cross over into the area of trade union
licensing .... " S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1959). Similarly, in testifying before
congressional subcommittees, impartial witnesses detailed the disadvantages of excessive federal
encroachment upon internal union matters. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 505 and Related Bills Before
the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
112 (1959) (testimony of Prof. Archibald Cox); Hearings On H.R. 3540 and Related Bills Before
the Joint Subcomm. on Educ. and Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1959) (testimony of Sec'y of
Labor Mitchell).
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rights to union members and impose concomitant obligations upon the
union to recognize and respect those rights. Nonetheless, the underlying
purpose of Title I is to equate the voice of union members in the affairs
of labor organizations with the voice of the public in governmental
affairs. 4 It was believed that only a democratically governed union
could foster the type of industrial relationships that national labor pol-
icy favored. 15
The aim of Congress in enacting these broad-based protections was
noble indeed; however, the Act is an example of "the fine art of political
compromise,"' 6 and is plagued with ambiguities. 7 The courts have been
faced with the paradoxical task of applying the provisions of the Act,
honoring the spirit of reform implicit in such social, remedial legisla-
tion, while at the same time giving credence to the avowed congressional
mandate of minimum interference in the internal affairs of labor organi-
zations.
The judicial development of sections 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(3) was
previously analyzed by one of the authors."8 This article is designed to
14. See R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 1005 (4th
ed. 1968).
15. The following remarks illustrate the divergent views concerning the role of democratic
procedures in internal union affairs and the role of government in guaranteeing such procedures:
None except a democratic union . . . can achieve the idealistic aspirations which justify
labor organizations. . . . Only in a democratic union can workers, through chosen repre-
sentatives, participate jointly with management in the government of their industrial lives
even as all of us may participate, through elected representatives, in political government.
. . . The task of assuring workers the ultimate control of the affairs of their union
should be undertaken by law because it is the law which gives a union, as bargaining
representative, the quasi-legislative power to bind employees in the bargaining unit without
their consent.
Cox, supra note 13, at 830.
[U]nion members have doubtless suffered far more from inefficient and unimaginative
administration than they have ever lost through corruption and undemocratic procedures.
Today, the key problem in union government is how to encourage innovation, a longer view
of the union's role and interests, and greater effectiveness in carrying out the policies and
programs of the organization. Democratic procedures do not ensure that union officials will
be pushed to optimum levels in these respects, and efforts to strengthen democratic pro-
cesses will not fill this need, but in some respects may make the problem worse.
D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 90 (1970).
16. Berchem, Labor Democracy in America: The Impact of Title I & IV of the Landrum-
Griffin Act, 13 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1967); see Cox, supra note 13, at 833; Rothman, supra note
13, at 205-09.
17. It has been argued that the ambiguities did not result from oversight or from excessive
compromise but, rather, that they were intentional. In effect, the Congress has charged the courts
with responsibility for developing a workable system of guaranteeing union democracy without
unnecessary interference. See Cox, supra note 13, at 852-54.
18. Beaird, Some Aspects of the LMRDA "'Bill of Rights," 5 GA. L. REV. 661 (1971).
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review the significant developments over the past 13 years dealing with
the free speech provisions of Title I appearing in section 101(a)(2).19 An
analysis of sections 101(a)(4) and 101(a)(5) will appear in a future edi-
tion of the Review.
II. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH
Prior to the LMRDA, the rights of union members relative to their
union were adjudicated by state courts, usually on the basis of contract
theory. The constitution and by-laws of the union were thought to be
the terms of a "contract" that the members accepted upon joining the
organization; the terms of this contract governed the relationship be-
tween member and organization. "It was the dominant view that the
letter of the union constitution-whatever that letter might be-con-
trolled, so that if discipline were imposed in accordance with that letter
the discipline was valid. '20
The New York case of Polin v. Kaplan21 is illustrative of the con-
tract theory. Union members were expelled from their union for bring-
ing charges against union officers in state court and for circulating
allegedly libelous statements concerning the officers. In discussing the
members' right to reinstatement and damages, Judge Kellogg stated:
The constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated association ex-
press the terms of a contract which define the privileges secured and the
duties assumed by those who have become members. As the contract may
prescribe the precise terms upon which a membership may be gained, so
may it conclusively define the conditions which will entail its loss. 22
The plaintiff union members also urged the court to review the factual
19. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
20. Hall, Freedom of Speech and Union Discipline: The Implications of Salzhandler, 17
N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 349, 352 (1964) (footnote omitted). See also IAM v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV.
1049 (1951). There is some authority that the relationship between a union and its members is
governed under theories of property law. Heasley v. Plasterers Local 31, 324 Pa. 257, 188 A. 206
(1936). And some authority indicates that union discipline sounds in tort. Hurwitz v. Directors
Guild, 364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966). See generally Chafee, The Interna-
tional Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 999-1010 (1930).
21. 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931). For similar applications of the contract theory, see
DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947); Porth v.
Carpenters Local 201, 171 Kan. 177, 231 P.2d 252 (1951); International Printing Pressmen v.
Smith, 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1946); Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104.
22. 257 N.Y. at 281-82, 177 N.E. at 834.
1973]
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findings made by the union tribunal, but the court refused, setting forth
a very limited scope of review.
[I]f the contract reasonably provides that the performance of certain acts
will constitute a sufficient cause for the expulsion of a member, and that
charges of their performance, with notice to the member, shall be tried
before a tribunal set up by the association, the provision is exclusive, and
the judgment of the tribunal, rendered after a fair trial, that the member
has committed the offenses charged and must be expelled, will not be
reviewed by the regularly constituted courts231
As indicated above, occasionally the courts did review union prac-
tices to determine whether procedural due process had been followed, 4
sometimes prohibiting union discipline that, although valid under union
constitutions and by-laws, directly interfered with the citizenship rights
of the union member. For example, a union was prevented from expel-
ling a member who, as a public official, refused to appoint another
union member to a public post.2" Also, unions have been compelled to
reinstate members who have testified against them in court,26 or who
have testified contrary to union positions before administrative agen-
cies.27
Nonetheless, prior to 1950 the courts generally adhered to the idea
that citizens' rights under the United States Constitution were not guar-
anteed to union members in the context of intra-union affairs. 2 So long
as the "contract" between union and members was not violated, the
union could discipline members for exercising "free speech" and other
rights that would be protected in the public arena.29 After 1950, how-
ever, the strict contract analysis of the rights of union members began
to crumble.
In Crossen v. Duffy,30 union members had circulated handbills
that charged incumbent officials with illegal and inefficient practices
23. Id. at 282, 177 N.E. at 834. The court, in fact, found that the union constitution did not
proscribe the activity charged against the members and therefore ordered reinstatement.
24. B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 1032 (1970).
25. Schneider v. Journeymen Plumbers Local 60, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1906).
26. Angrisani v. Stearn, 167 Misc. 731, 3 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Thompson v.
International Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S.W. 834 (Ct. Civ. App. 1905).
27. Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929).
28. See State v. North Cent. Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 23 F. Supp. 694,
700 (E.D. Ill. 1938); cf Gonzalez v. Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
29. See, e.g., Polin v. Kaplin, 257 N.Y. 277, -. , 177 N.E. 833, 834 (1931).
30. 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951).
[Vol. 25:577
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and warmly supported the challenging candidates. The union fined four
of the members and placed one on probation, but the Court of Appeals
of Ohio enjoined the union from enforcing the penalties,3 relying upon
the "property rights" of union membership and various provisions of
the state and federal constitutions. The court held that union members
retain their constitutional freedom of speech within the union and that
because unions often play a pivotal role "in special relation to their
members and to the state. . . .a court may well determine in a partic-
ular case that protection of their [the unions'] democratic processes is
essential to the maintenance of our democratic government." 3
A subsequent New York case33 refused to adhere to the previously
established contract analysis and held that a union member could not
be expelled for his efforts to establish a two-party system within the
union. Judge Fuld recognized that the government of unions was subject
to the principle that
traditionally democratic means of improving [the] union may be freely
availed of by members without fear of harm or penalty. And this neces-
sarily includes the right to criticize current union leadership. . . .The
price of free expression and of political opposition within a union cannot
be the risk of expulsion or other disciplinary action. In the final analysis,
a labor union profits . . . more by permitting free expression and free
political opposition than it may ever lose from any disunity that it may
thus evidence?
In a post-LMRDA case, Mitchell v. IAM,3 a California appellate
court abandoned contract analysis when the union discipline resulted
from a member's political activities outside the union. Two members
had actively supported a state "right-to-work" initiative, contrary to
expressed union policy, and were expelled. The court dispelled the "illu-
sion" that unions are purely voluntary, social organizations.
Unions can be distinguished from other voluntary organizations in many
respects. Most importantly, a large part of their power and authority is
derived from government which makes it [an] exclusive bargaining agent.
Further, they are not primarily social groups which require homogeneous
views in order to retain smooth functioning. They are large, heteroge-
neous groups, whose members may agree on one thing only-they want
31. Id. at 272-74, 103 N.E.2d at 779-80.
32. Id. at 271-72, 103 N.E.2d at 778.
33. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y,2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
34. Id. at 293, 151 N.E.2d at 78, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 640 (citation omitted).
35. 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
1973]
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improved working conditions and greater economic benefits. The union's
power, when considered together with its source, imposes upon it recipro-
cal responsibilities toward its membership and the public generally that
other voluntary organizations do not bear."
The court then examined the political activity of the plaintiffs to deter-
mine whether the union had any valid institutional purpose in imposing
the discipline and concluded that "society's interest in the debate, to-
gether with the individual's right to speak freely on political matters,
outweighs the union's interest in subduing public dissent among union
members.""7
These cases demonstrate a significant departure from the long-
dominant contract theory. This departure evidences a recognition that
a labor union's relationship with its members should not be analyzed
under concepts applicable to social organizations; because of their "pub-
lic" posture, unions cannot abrogate by contract certain inherent rights
possessed by citizens. And for the first time, the courts began to draw
from the broader social context in an effort to bring democracy to the
relatively closed system of union-member relations. These efforts were
legislatively crystallized by the LMRDA bill of rights, and the early
withdrawals from contract dogma were continued and extended by deci-
sions based upon section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA.
III. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 101(a)(2)
Unlike the guarantee of equal rights under section 101(a)(1), which
has been restricted in the election context by its interrelationship with
Title IV,"' the free speech and assembly guarantees of section 101(a)(2)
are not restricted by any other sections of the Act. Essentially, section
101(a)(2) ensures that every member of any labor organization shall
have the rights of free speech and freedom of assembly.39 Although
union membership is a prerequisite to the assertion of these rights," the
36. Id. at 799, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
37. Id. at 806, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
38. LMRDA §§ 401-03, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1970); see Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134
(1964).
39. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(2) (1970).
40. See Beaird, supra note 18, at 666; cf. Moynahan v. Pari-Mutuel Employees Local 280,
317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 911 (1963); Hughes v. Ironworkers Local 11, 287
F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961). The Act does not prescribe membership
requirements; that is largely a matter of organizational self-determination. See Parish v. Legion,
450 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1971); Hughes v. Ironworkers Local 11,287 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 25:577
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provisions of Title I have generally been limited to the rights of mem-
bers qua members-thus making most of the bill-of-rights protections
inapplicable to relationships between a member and another member"
or between a member and his employer.42 However, with respect to the
relationships between a union and its officers4 3 and employees," the
applicability of section 101(a)(2) has received a somewhat different in-
terpretation than the other provisions of Title I.5
It is apparent from section 609 of the Act" that a union may not
"fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for
exercising" free speech rights set forth in section 101(a)(2). One question
presented is whether officers or employees of a union can be removed
from their positions for supporting an unsuccessful candidate or cause.
If removal of a member from office is "discipline" within the meaning
of section 609, then removal for the exercise of a right protected by
section 101(a)(2) could be enjoined.
This question was resolved in Grand Lodge, 1AM v. King.47 First,
the Ninth Circuit analyzed the language of section 101(a)(2) and con-
cluded that the protections of that section applied to "every member"
of the union, including officer-members; a member did not forfeit pro-
tections of free expression upon becoming an official. "The guarantees
of [section 101(a)(2)] were adopted to strengthen internal union democ-
racy. To exclude officer-members from their coverage would deny pro-
tection to those best equipped to keep union government vigorously and
effectively democratic."48 Next, the court examined section 609 and
determined that to remove an official from union office was to discipline
41. See, e.g., Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961).
42. See, e.g., Jackson v. Martin Co., 180 F. Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1960).
43. See, e.g., Hill v. ARO Corp., 275 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Vars v. International
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 204 F. Supp. 241 (D. Conn. 1962), affd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).
44. See, e.g., Bennett v. Hoisting Eng'rs Local 701, 207 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1960); Strauss
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
45. Compare Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 204 F. Supp. 241 (D. Conn. 1962),
affd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963), with Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1969), and Cefalo v. District 50, UMW, 311 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1970).
46. LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or
other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel,
or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled
under the provisions of this chapter. The provisions of section [102]. . .shall be applicable
in the enforcement of this section.
47. 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964).
48. Id. at 344 (footnote omitted).
1973]
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that official. 9 Consequently, removal for reasons of political activity
protected by section 101(a)(2) was held actionable.
Subsequent decisions have followed the rationale of King;" in fact,
the rationale has been so closely followed that, without substantial dis-
cussion or analysis, courts have prohibited the removal of high-level
union officials-officials clearly within the policy-making level of the
union. These decisions raise substantial questions concerning the course
of labor policy.
Perhaps the leading case dealing with the protections afforded
officer-members by section 101(a)(2) is Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Re-
tail Clerks International."' Organizing directors of the union challenged
the incumbent slate for president and vice-president, expressing a sub-
stantially different philosophy regarding the organization of the union.
The directors lost the election and were removed from union office. In
spite of the expressed disagreement in philosophy and the high-level
posts occupied by the plaintiffs, the court held that the union violated
section 101(a)(2) by effecting their discharge.
A similar result was reached in Cefalo v. District 50, UMW.5 2
Among the plaintiffs were two regional directors who, after unsuccess-
fully seeking national office, were demoted to less influential positions.
Again, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that such demotion was discipline and thus violated the free speech
provisions of section 101(a)(2).53
Few would contest the premise upon which these cases are based.
Empowering an incumbent official to remove all opposition from union
offices would provide him with a powerful weapon for perpetuating his
regime. In many unions, those most interested in union affairs, the
officers, compose the pool of talented, experienced individuals from
which leaders must be drawn; yet, those occupying such responsible
49. The court reached a different interpretation of the term "discipline" within the "due
process" provisions of § 101(a)(5), holding that "discipline" within the meaning of that section
did not include removal from union office.
50. See, e.g., DeCampli v. Greely, 293 F. Supp. 746 (D.N.J. 1968); George v. Bricklayers
Union, 255 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Wis. 1966). But cf Rosen v. Painters Dist. Council 9, 57 L.R.R.M.
2401 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (membership in the Communist party held not protected by the LMRDA).
51. 299 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1969).
52. 311 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1970).
53. See also Paley v. Greenberg, 318 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prohibited the demo-
tion of union's executive secretary); Yablonski v. UMW, 71 L.R.R.M. 3041 (D.D.C. 1969) (pro-
hibited UMW from removing Yablonski as Director of the Labor Non-Partisan League on
grounds of incompatible philosophy).
[Vol. 25:577
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positions might be unwilling to gamble their posts against the uncertain
prospect of winning an election.
But these decisions have largely ignored the opposing factors. Few
would deny any elected public official the right to select his chief lieuten-
ants; in fact, the Constitution probably permits the wholesale removal
of even low-level civil servants on the basis of political disloyalty. 4
Union leadership, like political leadership, can be effective only when
the elected leader has confidence in the judgment and personal alle-
giance of his chief policy-makers. If the leadership is prohibited from
removing those who have expressed philosophical disagreement with
them and have manifested a lack of personal loyalty, the leadership
cannot be effective. High-level dissension and distrust will likely result,
and the health and vitality of the organization will suffer.
Clearly, subordinate union officials can and should be removed for
misuse of their office or for active insubordination.55 But Retail Clerks
and its progeny appear to ban dismissal of high-level officials, even after
their philosophy and fidelity have become suspect. These decisions deny
rights to labor leaders which are given as a matter of course to political
leaders, thereby causing the LMRDA to go further in subordinating
administrative effectiveness to free speech than even the Constitution
would seem to require. It is doubtful that the framers of the Act
intended such a result.
Perhaps the tension between the need to ensure union democracy
and the danger that union leadership will be hamstrung by dissident or
disloyal lieutenants could be relieved by the courts if they would closely
analyze the position, duties, and responsibilities of the demoted union
official before acting. Clearly, if the position is neither sensitive, nor
confidential, nor policy-making, it should not be jeopardized by open
political action.17 Union leadership should not be allowed to use the
54. Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972);
American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
But see Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
909 (1971).
55. Sewell v. Grand Lodge, IAM, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1971)
(active insubordination); cf. Gulickson v. Forest, 290 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (misuse of
union office during campaign).
56. Cf. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, the Court indicated
that a public employee might lawfully be discharged for publicly criticizing a superior if the
employee's relationship to the superior was of a "personal and intimate nature." Id. at 570 n.3.
57. The union could, perhaps, enact a "Hatch Act" protecting workers from political re-
moval but prohibiting their political activity. Discipline, in such cases, would be for violation of
the rule, and not directly attributable to the exercise of free speech. Such discipline would probably
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threat of dismissal from such jobs as a whip to secure loyalty. On the
other hand, if the position is one of confidence or involves high-level
policy formulation in circumstances where solidarity is necessary for
institutional effectiveness, demotion of an officer to a less sensitive
position would not seem to be discipline within the meaning of section
609. Demotion under such circumstances is, arguably, a necessary and
essentially non-discriminatory action designed to ensure the effective-
ness of the elected official's stewardship and the efficiency of the organi-
zation as an entity.
If the courts continue to view ad hoc removal of highly-placed
union officials as discipline, then allowance should be made for properly
enacted constitutional provisions that allow specifically designated
upper-level union positions to be held at the pleasure of the executive.
Such an authorization would greatly diminish the danger of capricious
removal and, for the reasons set forth above, would not appear to be
the type of discipline that sections 101 (a)(2) and 609 attempt to remedy.
IV. SECTION 101(a)(2) AND THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
A. The Proviso
The most significant potential limitation on the exercise of a union
member's right of free speech is contained in the proviso of section
101(a)(2):
[N]othing [in this section] shall be construed to impair the right of a labor
organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility
of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his
refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its
legal or contractual obligations."8
Arguably, a wide range of membership activities could fall within the
restrictions of this proviso and thereby lose the protection given by
section 101(a)(2).
Understandably, the most common question raised in section
101 (a) (2) cases has been whether the speech or expression at issue was
sufficiently detrimental to the union as an institution so that its interest
in prohibiting the speech outweighs the right of the union member to
express himself in the industrial democracy. If the union's interest is
be upheld. See Grand Lodge, IAM v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920
(1964).
58. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1970).
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paramount, discipline of members for criticism or libel will be upheld.
Thus, the proviso could afford the courts justification for narrowly
construing section 101(a)(2) so as to allow strong regulation by union
leadership of the rights protected by that section. The evolution of
decisions under section 101(a)(2), discussed below, demonstrates that
instead of following such a narrow course the courts have pursued a
liberal policy favoring the right of union members to express themselves.
A second issue occasionally raised is whether a union must have a
specific rule regulating this responsibility or whether general rules re-
garding "loyalty," "misconduct," and "libel" can be relied upon to
justify disciplinary action.
B. The Salzhandler Decision
The leading opinion involving section 101(a)(2) was rendered by
Chief Judge Lumbard in Salzhandler v. Caputo.59 Solomon Salzhandler,
the financial secretary of a local of the Paperhangers Union, discovered
and publicized, in a highly accusatory leaflet, certain union financial
transactions that he believed to be dishonest. Among other things,
Salzhandler called the local president, Webman, a petty robber. Salz-
handler and the incumbent officers of the local had long been at odds,
and the district as a whole had an extensive history of internal dissension
and bitterness." Webman brought an action against Salzhandler before
the union trial council, claiming that such defamation and disloyalty
violated the union constitution. A trial board found Salzhandler guilty
and suspended him from participation in union activities for 5 years.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld
the verdict of the union trial board on the ground that the leaflet was
libelous and, as such, its dissemination was unprotected by section
101(a)(2).6 The Second Circuit reversed, directing the district court to
enjoin the union from punishing Salzhandler and to assess damages."
The court rejected the contention that the guarantees of section
101(a)(2) do not extend to libel. The union had argued that, in view of
59. 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
60. See Note, Free Speech, Fair Trials, and Factionalism in Union Discipline, 73 YALE LJ.
472 (1964).
61. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 199 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The circulation of the leaflet
violated a provision of the union constitution forbidding "libeling" of union members or officers.
Id. at 556.
62. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1963).
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the Supreme Court's decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois3 (the first
amendment does not protect libelous utterances), the LMRDA could
not be given a more liberal construction. Chief Judge Lumbard was
quick to dismiss this reasoning, stating:
The analogy to the First Amendment is not convincing. . . . [T]he union
is not a political unit to whose disinterested tribunals an alleged defamer
can look for an impartial review of his "crime." It is an economic action
group, the success of which depends in large measure on a unity of
purpose and sense of solidarity among its members."
Thus, the court felt that to read the section in any manner other
than an extremely broad one would allow the union to define libelous
conduct. The court further determined that a union tribunal, because of
its recognized lack of impartiality, "is peculiarly unsuited for drawing
the fine line between criticism and defamation," 6 and should not be
entrusted with such a sophisticated task. Accordingly, in the Second
Circuit's view, the only exception to, or limitation on, a union member's
otherwise absolute right of free speech is the proviso to section
101(a)(2). Chief Judge Lumbard refused to recognize any other excep-
tions, holding that "the legislative history supports the conclusion that
Congress intended only those exceptions which were expressed."6 As
long as Salzhandler's accusations did not fall within the limits of the
proviso, it made no difference that they might be false and libelous.
In concluding that the charge made against Webman did not vio-
late Salzhandler's responsibility toward the union as an institution, the
court placed the first of a series of progressively narrower judicial con-
structions on the proviso. Inquiry and criticism by members concerning
the conduct of union officials and the union's financial affairs are
"clearly in the interest of proper and honest management of union
affairs." 7 Such is not only permissible, but desirable, even at the cost
of the inevitable dissension produced. Through this case the court lim-
ited redress for libel of an officer to a private suit for damages. 8
63. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
64. 316 F.2d at 449-50 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 450.
66. Id. (footnote omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 451. "[Allthough libelous statements may be made the basis of civil suit between
those concerned, the union may not subject a member to any disciplinary action on a finding by
its governing board that such statements are libelous." Id.; accord, Johnson v. Rockhold, 293 F.
Supp. 1016 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Garfman v. Ray, 71 L.R.R.M. 2108 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
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There is scant legislative history to support the conclusion that
section 101(a)(2) goes further in protecting libelous speech of union
members than does the first amendment in protecting such speech when
made by ordinary citizens. Yet that is the result of continued adherence
to the Salzhandler analysis. Salzhandler was decided before the land-
mark case of New York Times v. Sullivan,69 and thus predated the
refined concept of free speech and qualified privilege set forth therein.
In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that criticism of public
officials was subject to a qualified privilege, and thus was not actionable
by the aggrieved official unless the libel was known to be false or was
made with conscious disregard of its accuracy.
The Supreme Court has applied this concept of conditional privi-
lege in a labor relations setting, "by analogy, rather than under constitu-
tional compulsion."70 In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,71 the
Court was faced with the problem of reconciling state libel laws with
the free speech provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.7 2 It was
argued that the federal statute entirely preempted the field and that the
right of free speech in the labor-management context was unlimited;
thus, states could not apply the law of libel to such speech. The Court
rejected this argument. The National Labor Relations Act was held to
protect free, uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate that might in-
clude vehement and caustic attacks, so long as employer-union debate
fell short of deliberate or reckless untruth. The Court reasoned that
malicious utterances of defamatory statements have no social utility.
They are thus not protected by the federal statute and, consequently, are
subject to state libel laws. Quoting from an earlier decision,7 3 the Court
made a statement relevant to considerations under section 101(a)(2):
"'[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the
premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in
which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.' 74
Salzhandler placed no similar qualifications upon criticism made
69. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966).
71. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
72. National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970), provides:
The expressing of any views, arguments, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether
in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
73. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
74. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 67 (1966).
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by union members. Unlike criticism of public officials or the debate
between union and employer over questions of labor relations, the intra-
union freedom of speech under section 101(a)(2) has been absolute,
subject only to statutory qualifications.
Given the obvious propositions, relied upon by the Supreme Court,
that false statements maliciously made have no social utility and no role
in democratic government, and given the propositions that such charges
unnecessarily harm the individual attacked and potentially have a divi-
sive effect on the labor organization and its collective bargaining obliga-
tion, it is difficult to justify the continued acceptance of Salzhandler's
absolute privilege.
When Salzhandler was decided, without the benefit of the New
York Times doctrine, Chief Judge Lumbard may have believed that he
was faced with a choice between the extremes of "privilege" and "no-
privilege." In that context his choice was preferable. However, now that
a qualified privilege is recognized under the first amendment and has
played an analogous and prominent role in the robust area of debate
between union and employer under the National Labor Relations Act,
it would seem both logical and desirable to recognize that the privilege
established by section 101(a)(2) should be similarly qualified to protect
only nonmalicious speech.
Underlying the absolutist approach of Salzhandler was the fear
that union tribunals were unable or unwilling to make sophisticated
legalistic distinctions. That assumption, although probably correct, is
largely immaterial, since it ignores the fact that union discipline is
subject to de novo review in federal court. After a member has been
disciplined for "libel," the court is free to review the facts and determine
as a matter of law whether the statement constituted libel, and if so,
whether it was privileged. Simply stated, neither the courts nor the
individual union member will be, as Chief Judge Lumbard assumed, at
the mercy of the union tribunal.
But Salzhandler has been religiously followed,75 and the courts have
not adopted the New York Times concept of qualified privilege. Even
when it has been found that the criticisms were "malicious," courts have
75. Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969); International Bhd. of
Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965); Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965);
Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Sheridan v. Liquor Salesmen Local 2.
303 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Archibald v. Operating Eng'rs Local 57, 276 F. Supp. 326
(D.R.I. 1967); Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Stark v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 219 F. Supp. 528 (D. Minn. 1963).
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held them nonetheless protected by section 101(a)(2). 71
It has been argued that even assuming that an absolute privilege
exists inside the union hall (similar to congressional privilege in debate),
section 101(a)(2) should not guarantee the union member the right to
slander the union or its officials in a public forum. Such an argument
was initially rejected in the companion cases of Gartner v. Soloner77 and
Graham v. Soloner.78 In refusing to acknowledge such a restriction on
section 101 (a)(2), the Graham court drew an express parallel to consti-
tutional guarantees:
To say that a union member may not, without fear of reprisal, exercise a
right guaranteed to all citizens by the First Amendment would impose
on union democracy a boundary unwarranted both by the underlying
philosophy and the plain language of the [LMRDA].
If the Constitution is to provide the rationale and guidance for
delineating limitations on public debate of internal union affairs, it
would seem logical that the New York Times concept of qualified privi-
lege should likewise be utilized. Although the courts have not yet ex-
pressly rejected the qualified privilege concept, the decisions thus far
indicate that the absolute privilege in Salzhandler will be applied, and
that libelous statements made to the public will be privileged as if made
during internal union debate."0
C. Application of the Proviso: Speech Allegedly Harmful to the
Organization as an Institution
1. Libel of the Union, Union Officers, and Other Union
Members.- Unable to induce the courts to recognize a qualification of
the free speech protections of section 101(a)(2) for libelous criticisms
made by union members, the unions alleged that libel fell within the
proviso of section 101(a)(2) that permits a union to adopt and enforce
reasonable rules to ensure the responsibility of the members to the
76. Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 1 (1973);
Giordani v. Upholsterers Union, 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968); Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1965); Archibald v. Operating Eng'rs Local 57, 276 F. Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1967).
77. 220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
78. 220 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
79. Id. at 714.
80. Fulton Lodge No. 2, TAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969); Giordani v. Upholsterers
Union, 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968); Deacon v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 273 F. Supp. 169 (C.D.
Cal. 1967).
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organization as an institution. As mentioned above, the Salzhandler
court reasoned that even libelous statements were intended by Congress
to be protected free speech.8 For this reason, the court held that the
proviso does not authorize discipline for libelous allegations made in an
intra-union debate. The court stated further that free and open debate
was not harmful to the institution but, on the contrary, produced posi-
tive benefits far beyond the superficial dissension caused by the discus-
sion.
Generally, the courts have followed the lead of Salzhandler in hold-
ing that the constitutional requirements of the union should be con-
strued as narrowly as possible when weighed against the free speech
rights of union members.82 As one district court stated: "[O]nly if over-
whelming evidence were presented that comments adversely affected the
union, would such comments and criticisms of union officials come
within the ambit of the exceptions of section 101(a)(2)." 83 Conse-
quently, because the free speech protections found in the body of section
101(a)(2) are not substantially diluted by the institutional considerations
found in the proviso, reliance on the proviso has not produced a reliable
ground upon which a union can validly discipline a member who engages
in libelous speech.84
Unions have attempted to distinguish criticism of individuals from
criticism of the union itself. In Giordani v. Upholsterers Union,8" the
union pointed out that the libelous attack was upon the integrity of the
union and, because this was an attack upon the organization as an
institution, the proviso authorized discipline. The court neatly parried
the argument by observing that only officials can misappropriate funds;
therefore the speech, in reality, accused only officials of the union and
not the union itself. Accusations against individuals are protected by
section 101(a)(2) and are clearly outside the application of the proviso.
A similar observation was made in Deacon v. Operating Engineers
Local 12,86 in which a federal district court in California noted that
attacks upon the administration of the union may compromise the dig-
81. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963). See
notes 59-68 supra and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Giordani v. Upholsterers Union, 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968); Sheridan v. Liquor
Salesmen Local 2, 303 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
83. Archibald v. Operating Eng'rs Local 57, 276 F. Supp. 326, 330 (D.R.I. 1967).
84. See Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965); Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
85. 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968).
86. 273 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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nity of the individual union members but do not damage the institution.
In Robins v. Schonfeld,87 an attack upon the union's election procedure
resulted in discipline. Without commenting upon the distinction between
individual and institution, the court held that the criticism was protected
by section 101(a)(2) and outside the proviso, finding no distinction be-
tween the allegation of misappropriation of funds in Salzhandler and the
allegation of dishonest management of an election.
The unions have also asserted that needless dissemination of criti-
cism to the public-at-large constitutes disloyalty to the union. In
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Rafferty,88 the Ninth -Cir-
cuit avoided the argument by holding that this new element was not
relied upon by the union trial committee in imposing the discipline.
Consequently, the court would not consider whether it was a possible
justification for the attempts to draw a distinction between intra-union
attacks and libel disseminated in a public forum.89
The Fifth Circuit, in particular, has viewed the entire area of free
speech in unions as one of balancing individual rights against institu-
tional interests to determine what, if any, restrictions on speech are
reasonable. In applying such a balancing test, however, it would ap-
pear that libelous attacks made in public,, without attempts to utilize
internal union processes, and attacks made directly against the actions
of the union as an entity would weigh more heavily in favor of discipline
than would attacks against an individual's stewardship narrowly pub-
lished to those in the union. As of now, however, the courts do not
appear to be making any such distinctions.
Deacon v. Operating Engineers Local 1291 raised the issue of actual
damage. The court observed that the plaintiff attempted to rectify any
damaging impression left by his publication and thereby removed the
possibility of a detrimental reflection upon the union as an institution.
But, the court's observation leaves the negative implication that had the
plaintiff failed to correct patently false accusations, his expulsion from
the union might have been permitted by the proviso. Other courts, too,
have indicated that the absence of any actual damage to the union
87. 326 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
88. 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965).
89. See Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969); Gartner v. Soloner,
220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Graham v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Beaird
& Sutter, Labor Law and Related Social Legislation, 21 MERCER L. REV. 617, 628-30 (1970).
90. See Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 1969).
91. 273 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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influenced the finding of inapplicability of the proviso.12 These cases
raise the possibility that libelous comments directed toward the union
as an institution will not result in discipline of the attackers without
proof of actual damage.
Finally, it would seem that the union can adopt reasonable rules
relating to the conduct of union meetings.93 Although the content of
speech cannot be made subject to discipline, rules of procedure and
decorum at union meetings could be enacted and enforced. 4 Arbitrary
or unreasonable rules cannot be utilized to silence criticism, however.
2. Threatening Physical Harm.-In Kelsey v. Stage Employees
Local 8,15 the vice-president of a local was suspended for threatening the
president with physical violence. The district court96 found no evidence
in the record to support the union's charges and implied that even had
such threats been made, the conduct would have been protected" by
section 101(a)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence to
support the union's contention that threats were made and, therefore,
found "no need or use" to discuss whether such threats were privileged.
A decision from the District of New Mexico, Reyes v. Laborers
Local 16,11 indicates that section 101 (a)(2) goes further in protecting the
free speech of union members than does the Constitution; nonetheless,
the court held that threats of physical harm were not protected, thereby
upholding union discipline of a member who made such threats. The
Reyes decision was followed recently by a New York district court that
also held threats of physical violence to be unprotected.'
These decisions might be considered a retreat from the absolute
view expressed in Salzhandler that any speech is privileged. Certainly,
some faith must be placed in the ability of a union tribunal to distinguish
between an unprotected threat and permissible, vigorous advocacy of
92. See Archibald v. Operating Eng'rs Local 57, 276 F. Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1967); Gartner
v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Graham v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa.
1963).
93. See Fulton Lodge No. 2, 1AM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969).
94. Patterson v. Motion Picture Operators Local 513, 446 F.2d 205 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 976 (1971).
95. 419 F.2d 491 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1064 (1969).
96. 294 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
97. Id. at 1374-75.
98. 419 F.2d at 493.
99. 327 F. Supp. 978 (D.N.M. 1971).
100. Hoyt v. Carpenters Local 1292, 80 L.R.R.M. 2188 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). A subsequent
decision of the Third Circuit, interpreting Kelsey, indicated that § 101(a)(2) provided protection
to "loosely-worded threats." Semancik v. District 5, UMW, 466 F.2d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 1972).
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one's views. It must be understood that union members do not express
their opinions with the delicacy one might find in a civic or religious
organization. Thus, union tribunals, as well as courts, might easily find
"loosely-worded threats" in relatively commonplace criticisms.
Section 101(a)(2) protects only the right to express "views, argu-
ments, or opinions"; threats of physical violence, obviously, do not fall
within this category. Furthermore, threats of harm have a negative
social utility since they tend to silence the timid and aggravate the
intrepid. The Supreme Court has indicated that threats are not pro-
tected by the first amendment;10' as well, the NLRB and the courts have
held that a provision in the National Labor Relations Act' 2 similar to
section 101(a)(2) does not permit one to make threats or to engage in
coercive conduct.' Although courts will have to analyze union charges
carefully to determine whether clear and substantial threats were made,
it remains difficult to conclude that obvious threats of physical abuse
were intended by Congress to be protected, privileged speech.
3. Criticism During Collective Bargaining Negotiations.
Although the courts have given extensive protection to the content of
speech and criticism both within and without the union, there is some
indication that the timing of the speech might be subject to valid union
regulation. Leonard v. M.L T. Employees' Union"4 involved the expul-
sion of a member for making charges against union officials and for
participating in other allegedly detrimental activities during collective
bargaining negotiations. The Massachusetts district court refused to
uphold the discipline imposed, but skirted the important issue.
Assuming that the union would have the right to adopt and enforce a rule
temporarily limiting free expression by members of their views, argu-
ments and opinions at the time of contract negotiations, the union here
never purported to adopt any such rule, and the proviso relied upon has
no application."'
101. See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). "[C]onduct, though
evidenced in part by speech, may amount, in connection with other circumstances, to coercion
.Id. at 477. See also cases cited in note 103 infra.
102. National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970), provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether
in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this [Act], if such expression contains no threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
103. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers,
Inc., 375 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1967).
104. 225 F. Supp. 937 (D. Mass. 1964).
105. Id. at 940.
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Judge Ford held, in essence, that before the proviso can be relied upon
to punish otherwise protected speech, the union must have a specific
provision in its constitution or by-laws setting forth the parameter of
the limitations; in other words, speech could not be punished under a
general rule condemning "disloyalty." By negative implication, the deci-
sion suggests that if a union properly adopted a "reasonable" rule tem-
porarily restraining a member's speech during contract negotiations, the
union might be able to impose the type of discipline that this court
invalidated.
In Falcone v. Dantinne,00 a union member had urged other mem-
bers to strike while local officers were simultaneously urging them to
work in the face of a tentative contract agreement. The union had
previously agreed with the employer that there would be no work stop-
page during contract negotiations. For urging violation of the union
promise, Falcone was found guilty of disloyalty. The issue before the
trial court was whether the actions of Falcone were protected under
section 101(a)(2) or whether they amounted to an unjustified interfer-
ence with the union's performance of its legal or contractual obligations
within the scope of the proviso. The lower court failed, however, to
confront this issue directly and held that when union tribunals reach
such decisions they should not be disturbed unless "manifestly unrea-
sonable."' 0 The court did not pursue the question whether the conduct
actually hindered performance of the union's contractual obligations. It
found that the discipline was "merely the enforcement by the Union of
reasonable rules dealing with the responsibility of each member to the
Union, and was not an interference with the plaintiff's right of free
speech."' '08 The Third Circuit' 0 reversed on the ground that the union
tribunal was biased. Thus, the lower court's holding concerning the
inapplicability of the free speech protections was not disturbed.
In Farnum v. Kurtz, 0 a California appellate court refused to en-
force a union fine imposed on a member who, in a letter to the employer
and a newspaper, had criticized the settlement reached between em-
ployer and union. The criticism was made before the formal contract
had been signed. The union argued that the fine was valid because the
criticism, after agreement but before formalization, interfered with the
106. 288 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
107. Id. at 726.
108. Id. at 728.
109. 420 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1969).
110. 72 L.R.R.M. 2794 (Cal. App. 1969).
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union's legal and contractual obligations. After holding that neither the
letter to the employer nor the one to the press "violated his responsibil-
ity to the union 'as an institution,'" the court also stated that the
criticism did not interfere with any legal obligation of the union. In
addition, the court hinted, as had the court in Leonard v. M.LT. Em-
ployees' Union,"' that the union could adopt specific rules regulating
the timing of critical speech but that broadly drafted rules could not be
used as a basis for punishing such speech-a variation on the constitu-
tional doctrine of overbreadth." 2 A recent Third Circuit decision','
specifically held that a union could not call the proviso into play by
general constitutional prohibitions against "corrupt conduct" and the
like. If one was being prosecuted by the union under such vague prohibi-
tions, members could enjoin the proceedings under section 101(a)(2)
said the court. For the union to claim the benefit of the proviso, the
union rules would have to specify the type of speech proscribed.
4. Urging Members Not to Pay Their Dues.-Nothing strikes at
the heart of a union quite so directly as urging members to abandon
their financial support; yet, in such instances, the right of free speech
has been given broad protection. The landmark case is Farowitz v.
Musicians Local 802,114 decided by the Second Circuit less than one year
after Salzhandler. Farowitz had urged his fellow members to refuse to
pay a tax levied on musicians who worked regularly, because the collec-
tion of this tax by orchestra leaders had been ruled unlawful in an earlier
decision."' Since the union constitution and by-laws provided no other
method of collection, he argued that any collection would be improper.
Farowitz was found guilty of seeking "to undermine the very existence
of the Local""' and expelled from the union. The court ordered Faro-
witz reinstated, finding that the Salzhandler case controlled. Although
recognizing that adequate funding is crucial to a union and implying
that in theory there may be "some situations in which a union member
would not be protected against disciplinary measures if he were to urge
other members to forego paying their dues,"" 7 the court left little room
111. 225 F. Supp. 937 (D. Mass. 1964); see text accompanying note 104 supra.
112. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
113. Semancik v. District 5, UMW, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972).
114. 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964).
115. Carroll v. Associated Musicians, 206 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d
574 (2d Cir. 1963).
116. 330 F.2d at 1001.
117. Id. at 1002.
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for the application of this "theory," stating:
[A] member having . . . good reasons . . . to believe that the collection
of taxes or dues runs afoul of the law has the right to call this to the
attention of the membership and to urge that they refrain from paying
such assessments.
A rule which subjects a member to expulsion for complaining
of a tax which he reasonably believes to be illegal is not a reasonable
rule.""
It would appear that regardless of the impact on the union, if a member
holds a good-faith, reasonable belief that a tax, assessment, or other
dues payment is illegal his advocacy of nonpayment will be protected.
This leaves a wide range of permissible speech.
5. Dual Unionism.-There is no greater treachery, from a union
standpoint, than for a member to advocate and campaign for a rival
union. For a long time it was thought that if there was any activity which
was not protected by section 101(a)(2), it was this "heinous crime" of
disloyalty known as "dual unionism." An early case confirmed that
view. In Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, IAM,1" 9 plaintiffs were found guilty
of dual unionism by a union tribunal and expelled; the District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri refused to accept the argument that
the advocacy of dual unionism was protected free speech. The court, in
finding the proviso applicable, reasoned:
When local officers encourage local members to break away from the
national organization and form an independent union, it clearly under-
mines the responsibility of local members to the national organization,
and threatens the enforcement of contractual obligations. Therefore, the
advocation of dual unionism is not protected . . . under Title 1.120
In a 1971 case, Airline Maintenance Lodge 702, 1AM v.
Loudermilk,' the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the Sawyers decision.
The facts in Loudermilk are distinguishable, however. Loudermilk had
been required to join the IAM because of a union shop agreement, but
afterwards he also joined a rival union and became its president. In 1967
Loudermilk actively supported the rival organization in a representation
election which the IAM won by a narrow margin. Loudermilk was tried
118. Id.
119. 279 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo. 1967); accord, Ballas v. McKiernan, 74 L.R.R.M. 2647
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970) (fine enforced for "dual unionism").
120. 279 F. Supp. at 756.
121. 444 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 25:577
HeinOnline  -- 25 Ala. L. Rev. 600 1972-1973
Free Speech and the LMRDA
by the IAM trial committee, found guilty of dual unionism, and was
fined, instead of being expelled from the union. The IAM then filed an
action in federal district court to collect the fine. The district court
granted Loudermilk's motion for summary judgment, holding that al-
though the union could successfully bring suit to enforce validly imposed
fines, the penalty invoked in Loudermilk's case was invalid because the
charges "arose out of activities protected by the free speech provision ' 122
of section 101(a)(2).
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Bell reiterated the standards
for testing speech under section 101(a)(2) as set forth in Fulton Lodge
No. 2, IAM v. Nix.12 Freedom of speech has been broadly construed
to guarantee union democracy; however, the prerogatives of free speech
must be balanced against the institutional responsibilities of unions.124
The Loudermilk court then considered the facts, particularly noting that
the "IAM did not choose to expel him or to bar him from meetings and
the like, defensive actions which would have protected IAM. Rather,
IAM sought to compel his allegiance by the imposition of a fine."' The
court then discussed cases arising under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.1 21 In short, those decisions indicated that a
union may, as a reasonable defensive measure, validly expel. a union
member who advocates dual unionism, but that the union has no justifi-
cation for the imposition of a fine for such conduct.'2 The court decided
that the discipline imposed upon Loudermilk went too far:
We think this exceeded the authority of the union under the circum-
stances here which involve compulsory membership under a union shop
agreement coupled with the free speech overtones which are inherent in
122. Id. at 721.
123. 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969).
124. Lodge 702, IAM v. Loudermilk, 444 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1971).
125. 444 F.2d at 723 (footnote omitted).
126. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). The pertinent
portion of § 158(b) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(I) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title. ...
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities. . ..
127. NLRB v. Molders Local 125, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971); Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d
443 (9th Cir. 1967); Tri-Rivers Marine Eng'rs Union, 189 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (1971).
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undertaking[s] stemming from dissatisfaction with one union and action
seeking to displace that union with another.'8
Quoting the district court, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
If the [union] could impose a judicially collectible fine upon a union
member who had become satisfied [sic] with the union's representation
and sought to replace it with a rival, it could effectively eliminate all
criticism of its policies and foreclose any challenge of its right to represent
its members.' 9
Following the Loudermilk case, it is not entirely clear whether
advocacy of dual unionism is absolutely protected by section 101(a)(2)
or whether dual unionism falls within the proviso allowing the union to
ensure the responsibility of the members to the organization. An exam-
ination of the existing authority indicates that a union could discipline
a member who advocates dual unionism by expulsion, but not by the
imposition of a fine. Such discipline is institutionally "reasonable" when
balanced against the free speech rights of the member. He can continue
to advocate the rival union, but not as an insider or spokesman for the
incumbent union. On the other hand, it is institutionally "unreasonable"
for the union to retain a member, yet attempt to silence him by imposi-
tion of fines. This rationale indicates that the speech itself is not privi-
leged or absolutely protected; it is merely a question whether the union
actions fall within the "reasonable rules" of the proviso. As indicated
by the Fifth Circuit, reasonableness is determined primarily by bal-
ancing the individual right of free speech, which is given broad protec-
tion, with the institutional needs of the union.' 30
A strong argument can be made that rank-and-file advocacy of a
rival union should be absolutely protected.'"' To allow expulsion places
a union man in an untenable position. Although he believes that a rival
union might better represent the interests of the employees, he must
keep his beliefs silent or risk expulsion, thus being denied, perhaps
forever, the right to participate in and influence the affairs of the cur-
128. 444 F.2d at 723-24.
129. Id. at 724.
130. Id. at 723.
131. In Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, IAM, 279 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo. 1967), the expelled
members were officers of the local. One could argue that discipline of officers seeking to lead the
union out of an international is reasonable, whereas discipline of a rank-and-file member seeking
to persuade fellow members to follow a different leader might be unreasonable. The status of the
speaker might well be a more reliable guide for distinguishing the cases than the nature of the
discipline imposed.
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rently certified representative. One tenet underlying the National Labor
Relations Act is that representative capacity should be determined by
the free and unencumbered will of the majority. 32 A union rule that
substantially inhibits the members of the current representative in their
support for a rival representative deprives the rival of perhaps its only
source of support, thereby frustrating the NLRA's policy of free choice.
Furthermore, a rule that demands "loyalty" from members to the ex-
tent that they cannot state that another union might better represent the
employees assumes that institutional concerns are more important than
the interests of the majority of the members. Such an assumption runs
counter to the philosophy of freedom of expression and majority self-
determination'3 underlying the entire LMRDA.
This is not to say that a union cannot take defensive measures to
protect its campaign strategy or other inside information from espio-
nage. But such legitimate ends can perhaps be secured without imposing
upon the members an artificial "loyalty" that infringes upon their rights
to freely express their views on the entire spectrum of union issues.
The distinction drawn between fines and expulsion as reasonable
rules is, at best, strained. The National Labor Relations Act clearly
states that "[n]othing in this [Act] shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in
which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial
law." 34 But the Act does authorize agreements that compel employees
to support the exclusive representative financially . 3  Thus, the Fifth
Circuit in Loudermilk was not entirely correct when it assumed that the
union security clause required Loudermilk to be a member of the union.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently indicated that even when
one is a member of the union he may freely resign when the union's
course of conduct is contrary to his personal beliefs, and thereby escape
union discipline. 31
132. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964). See also Sewell Mfg. Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 66 (1962); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
133. Even speech deemed by some to be "disloyal" to our current system of government
may, in certain circumstances, be protected by the first amendment. See Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970).
135. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963);! Retail Clerks Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
136. NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
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When an individual elects to become a union member, submits
himself to the rules of the organization (including the loyalty provi-
sions), and remains a member even while planning to violate those rules,
there is perhaps little difference between the reasonableness of fining
that member and expelling him. 137 If it is unreasonable for the orga-
nization to fine an individual who willingly accepts and retains mem-
bership while campaigning for a rival organization, it would seem to be
equally unreasonable for that organization to expel him. Conversely, if
it is reasonable for the organization to expel a member for disloyal
speech, it would appear reasonable for the organization to fine a mem-
ber who willingly accepted and retained membership while engaging in
such disloyal conduct.
6. Insubordination.-M embers of a labor organization who are
also officers or employees of the organization are protected by the free
speech provisions of section 101(a)(2). 138 Notwithstanding that protec-
tion, union officers may validly be punished for misuse of their office. 39
It becomes difficult, however, to determine the extent to which an offi-
cer may be disciplined for lesser forms of insubordination without in-
fringing upon the recognized right of free speech.
In Sewell v. Grand Lodge, IA M,14" the plaintiff alleged that he had
been wrongfully discharged from his office of union representative be-
cause he opposed certain proposals of the union executive council. The
Union claimed that Sewell, as a representative, was responsible for the
execution of the policies of the executive council, and thus his expressed
opposition amounted to insubordination. The Fifth Circuit first ad-
dressed itself to the question of the statute of limitations. Concluding
that the action was "essentially in the nature of a tort for the alleged
violation of rights claimed under the [LMRDA]," the court held that
the action was barred by the Alabama statute of limitations (one year)
on actions ex delicto.1'4 The opinion added, however, that apart from
the statutory bar, the plaintiff had no right to relief. The court agreed
that free speech and freedom to participate in union affairs were rights
137. Compare NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (expulsion), with
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969) (fine).
138. E.g., Grand Lodge, IAM v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
920 (1964).
139. Barbour v. Sheet Metal Workers, 401 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1968); Gulickson v. Forest,
290 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
140. 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1971).
141. Id. at 550.
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guaranteed to every member, but because of plaintiffs position as an
officer, the court placed some limits on that right. The court stated:
This conclusion [that each member is entitled to the right of free speech]
• . . does not permit an employee who accepts employment for the per-
formance of certain specified duties to take the largesse and pay of the
union, on the one hand, and, on the other, to completely subvert the
purposes of his employment by engaging in activities diametrically op-
posed to the performance of his specified duties. . . If a conflict of
interest arises between an individual's desire to oppose the plans and
policies of his employer and the discharge of the duties of the position in
which he is employed, fundamental considerations of fair play would
require him to remove himself from such a position.
To hold that a union has no right to discharge an employee for
insubordination under the facts of his [sic] case would, we believe, seri-
ously detract from effective, cohesive union leadership. The result might
well be weak, ineffective and fragmented unions which would be para-
lyzed in bargaining for the rights and welfare of union members against
the monolithic front of large commercial corporations in the modern
commercial world.14
2
This decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of the
first amendment rights of public employees. In Pickering v. Board of
Education, ' 3 the Court upheld the right of a school teacher to criticize
policies of the school system where he was employed, but apparently
reserved to the public employer the right to discipline conduct that
interfered with confidential relationships and performance of duties, or
that constituted insubordination. The Sewell court found, as a fact, that
the plaintiff had been insubordinate and thus was subject to discipline,
but it did not attempt to establish a test by which future courts could
factually distinguish protected free speech and unprotected insubordina-
tion. Making such distinctions will, no doubt, prove a difficult task. The
test likely to be applied will be the balancing test enunciated in
Pickering and in a number of Fifth Circuit decisions:' The free speech
of the individual will be weighed against the institutional needs of the
union.
The Sewell decision is significant for a number of reasons. First,_
the employer-employee relationship is used as a basis for denying, at
142. Id. at 550-52 (footnotes omitted).
143. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
144. E.g., Lodge 702, IAM v. Loudermilk, 444 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1971); Fulton Lodge
No. 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 1969).
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least to a degree, full rights of free speech to a member-officer, a con-
cept contrary to earlier decisions in the area. Second, it indicates that
each case of free speech is to be judged on its particular facts, as pro-
posed by Professor Kroner. "' Third, the court states that the union has
certain prerogatives as a result of its need to preserve its solidarity as
an institutional warrior in the labor-management struggle, even at the
cost of internal democracy, as advocated by Professors Bok and Dun-
lop."' It is probably too early to ascertain the impact this decision will
have upon the Salzhandler-King line of decisions which recognize an
absolute freedom of speech, even at the expense of internal solidarity.
V. SECTION 101(a)(2) AND THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY
In addition to freedom of speech, section 101(a)(2) provides that
"[e]very member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet
and assemble freely with other members . . "" This clause has been
interpreted in two ways. The first is that the union cannot interfere with
the right of the members to meet and assemble informally, but it has
no obligation to provide meetings for the members. "8 This is a negative
restraint only, similar to that imposed upon governmental bodies by the
first amendment. The second interpretation is that this section imposes
a positive duty upon the union as an institution to order meetings re-
quired by the union constitution and by-laws, a duty which can be
affirmatively enforced by aggrieved union members.
The conflicting interpretations of the section received consideration
in the case of Yanity v. Benware.49 Plaintiffs, who had been discharged
from their jobs, submitted their grievances to arbitration, only to be
denied relief. Judicial review of the arbitrator's decision was sought, but
under New York law the union was required to be a party litigant in
order to obtain such review, and Benware, president of the local, refused
to institute such a suit. Plaintiffs then obtained the number of signatures
required by the union constitution to authorize a special meeting, but
Benware refused to call the meeting. Suit was brought under the
LMRDA; the plaintiffs claimed that the refusal to call a lawful meeting
145. Kroner, Title I of the LMRDA: Some Problems of Legal Method and Mythology, 43
N.Y.U.L. REv. 280 (1968).
146. See note 15 supra.
147. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(2) (1970).
148. See Yanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874 (1967).
149. 376 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1967).
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violated their right of assembly protected by section 101(a)(2).
Speaking for a majority of the Second Circuit panel, Judge Hays
read the statute as securing only the right of members to meet in infor-
mal sessions without interference from the union. The court, concluding
that the statute did not grant the privilege of demanding full-blown
membership meetings, based its decision upon the absence of express
congressional intent to require full membership meetings, an intent that
could have easily been expressed.
Chief Judge Lumbard dissented, arguing that the majority opinion
ignored the underlying purpose of the Act-the promotion of union
democracy. The Chief Judge asserted that section 101(a)(2), although
guaranteeing the right of free speech, could easily be emasculated by the
refusal of union officials to provide a realistic forum for the expression
of differing views. "A union leadership can stifle attempts by members
to influence union policy as effectively by refusing to hold required
meetings as by refusing the floor to members of opposing views." 5 ' The
dissent also argued that granting the right to speak freely at union
meetings implied a statutory requirement that meetings be held.
Professor Atleson, in an excellent discussion of the issue, 51 sup-
ports the need for court enforcement of union laws governing special
meetings by arguing that such enforcement is "critical to guarantee
democratic rights and procedures."'5 2 Atleson states, "Since the court
would merely be requiring the union to abide by its own constitution,
there is no problem of over extending the act [to internal union af-
fairs].' '5 3
If the LMRDA preempted any resort to state law and remedies,
the result of Yanity would perhaps be indefensible. But section 103154
specifically provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall limit the rights and remedies
of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law
or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and
bylaws of any labor organization.
Applying the predominant contract theory of the relationship be-
tween the union and its members, a union member who desires to call
150. Id. at 203 (dissenting opinion).
15 1. Atleson, A Union Member's Right to Free Speech and Assembly: Institutional Inter-
ests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L. REv. 403 (1967).
152. Id. at 438.
153. Id. at 439.
154. LMRDA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1970).
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a meeting could probably secure specific performance of the union con-
stitution or by-laws requiring the holding of such meetings. Rather than
federal courts having power under the LMRDA to order meetings, state
courts would possess that authority under section 103 and state contract
laws. The free speech provisions of section 101(a)(2) would, of course,
be applicable at any union meeting and, therefore, enforceable by the
federal courts.
Chief Judge Lumbard's dissenting views in Yanity have found ex-
pression in a majority opinion concerning a somewhat different issue in
Navarro v. Gannon.'55 In that case, the Second Circuit affirmed the
issuance of a preliminary injunction that prevented a parent union from
taking control of a meeting of one of its locals. Because of certain
administrative problems, the international sought to have national offi-
cers henceforth preside over the local's meetings. The international
argued that such a procedure was not a violation of any right protected
by section 101(a)(2), but Chief Judge Lumbard disagreed. After analyz-
ing the union constitution, he determined that the president had not
acted according to the constitutional requisites for the imposition of a
trusteeship. Moreover, he found that nothing in the legislative history
of section 101 (a)(2) indicated any consideration of what he felt was the
issue in the case: "the right of local members to run the affairs of their
union without interference from the international union with which they
are affiliated."' 56 Using the same reasoning as in his dissent in Yanity,
Lumbard stated:
[T]he guaranty in Section 101(a)(2) of the equal right to participate in
the deliberations and voting at union meetings, and the guaranty in Sec-
tion 101(a)(2) of the right to express views upon business before the
meeting necessarily encompass the right to assemble, consult and decide
matters of concern to the local union without the inhibiting presence and
control by international officials.5 7
Accordingly, the court concluded that members of locals are pro-
tected from national reprisals that attempt to restrain their criticisms,
opposition, or recalcitrance. To allow hostile officers to control union
meetings would abuse the democratic scheme encouraged by the Act.
Such a position, the court reasoned, was not at odds with the decision
155. 385 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 989 (1967).
156. Id. at 517.
157. Id. at 518. See also Williams v. Typographical Union, 423 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
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in Yanity, since the right to meet and assemble was not at issue in the
Navarro case, which involved only the right to discuss matters at validly
called meetings without the inhibition caused by outside interference.
Navarro could be read as merely another "discipline" case in which
free speech and dissension were squelched by imposing new leadership
on the dissenters. However, an expansive interpretation of the decision
indicates that section 101(a)(2) grants an affirmative right to each de-
fined "labor organization" to be presided over by local officers selected
by the members of that "organization." Wholly apart from Title IV
election procedures, and except for validly imposed trusteeships, each
organization has a Title I right to demand its "own" officers.
Under Yanity, the right-to-assembly provision of section 101(a)(2)
has received a more narrow interpretation than the free speech provi-
sion. The Navarro case, however, suggests that a close relationship
exists between the "speech" and "assembly" provisions of section
101(a)(2), and also evidences a perceptible retreat in philosophy from
the rather narrow interpretation afforded the right of assembly by
Yanity. Navarro further indicates that when assembly encompasses ele-
ments of free speech extensive protection will be provided; whether
Navarro goes beyond this and provides an additional affirmative right
to hold meetings chaired by locally selected officers remains to be de-
cided.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evolution of judicial interpretation under section 101(a)(2) of
the LMRDA has forcefully demonstrated that the courts, in the over-
whelming majority of situations, are prepared to allow union members
to engage in a wide variety of expressive activity, in a judicial effort to
carry out the legislative purpose of the Act-assuring "to union mem-
bers a basically democratic union organization with the concomitant
protections against arbitrary and despotic control by union leaders."'' 8
In pursuing that objective, the courts have placed an extremely
narrow interpretation upon the proviso to section 101(a)(2), so that it
authorizes union discipline for speech and assembly related activity only
if extreme misconduct is involved. Otherwise, the proviso has been ren-
dered powerless as a means of curbing free speech and assembly among
union members.
158. Schuchardt v. Millwrights Local 2834, 380 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1967).
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As expected, the expanding liberal construction of the guarantees
of section 101(a)(2) has caused some internal dissension and insurgency
in the unions, but the courts, as well as most legal scholars, have felt
that it is in the best interest of both workers and society to encourage
participatory democracy in the labor movement rather than attempting
to protect, through enforced loyalty, the union's solidarity as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative for its members. In the area of free as-
sembly, however, some official prerogatives, such as the refusal to call
union meetings, have been recognized.
Finally, the idea of a relatively unfettered right to free speech and
assembly in an industrial democracy has been based upon, and has also
influenced, the growth and scope of first amendment rights and issues
in the larger social context. This dialogue between the two structures has
been the result of a conscious desire to protect individual free expression
as a means of both placing moral strictures on all types of social institu-
tions and strengthening the identity and involvement of each member
of those institutions.
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